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Abstract: A few years ago, economic historian Albrecht Ritschl proposed the thesis that the 
socio-economic structures of the Federal Republic of Germany were more strongly influenced by 
path dependencies from the Third Reich than by the Federal Republic's regulatory policy. I 
subject this thesis to a critical review. From a functional perspective, I argue with regard to (1) 
the intensity of competition, (2) material prosperity and its distribution, and (3) producer and 
consumer sovereignty that the early Federal Republic was characterized much more by ties to 
regulatory traditions from the Weimar period than by path dependencies from the Third Reich. 
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The Short Third Reich: On the Question of the continuity of Socio-Economic 
Structures between the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich and the Federal Republic 
 
1. Beyond the myths 
The founding myths of the Federal Republic of Germany can be outlined in terms of their 
economic aspects with just a few catchwords: zero hour, Marshall Plan, currency reform, 
Ludwig Erhard, social market economy, economic miracle. The economic-historical research 
of the past four decades has subjected all these catchwords to a closer examination and has 
qualified or even negated the contribution of the phenomena or personalities behind them 
to explaining the economic recovery of West Germany after 1945/48. Werner Abelshauser 
popularized estimates by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), according to 
which the destruction of production capacities was by no means so extensive that one could 
speak of a zero hour in 1945 or 1948. On the contrary, the gross investments due to the 
armament build-up since 1936 were so high that, despite aerial war damage and dismant-
ling, industrial assets in the West had a higher value in 1948 than in 1936 (Krengel 1958: 76-
77, 94; Baumgart/Krengel 1970; and Abelshauser 1975: 114-30). Accordingly, no miracle 
effects are attributed to the Marshall Plan any longer (see the debate between Abelshauser 
1981, Ritschl 1985 and Abelshauser 1989). Much more important than financial aid, which 
directly benefited Germany only to a small extent, was the resumption of domestic (West) 
German and West European foreign trade regarding which an initially temporary renuncia-
tion by German foreign creditors was necessary, as Helge Berger and Albrecht Ritschl have 
pointed out (Berger/Ritschl 1995). In addition to the old debts of the German Reich 
originating in the period before 1933, these include above all Germany's clearing debts 
accumulated during the Second World War (see Scherner’s new estimate of 2012) and the 
waiver of the immediate demand for reparations in the London Debt Agreement of 1953. 
Although the significance of the currency reform is acknowledged in research through-
out, reference is also made today to the simultaneous release of many – but by no means all 
(Zündorf 2006; and Steiner 2006) – prices in the Leitsätzegesetz (Guiding Principles Act), 
which was passed at the same time. However, the double liberation through currency 
reform and price liberalisation was not only the result of German policy, but had been 
decreed by the American occupation force defining the baseline and only leaving the details 
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to German experts (Buchheim 1988, 1999). The Deutschmark, as Albrecht Ritschl (2005: 151) 
provocatively formulated it, was basically “American occupation money”. 
Ludwig Erhard, who since the late 1940s had allowed himself to be transfigured as an 
icon of the social market economy, had originally rejected this term. He was concerned with 
a return to capitalism, which had been thoroughly discredited by the world economic crisis, 
and which was forced into a corset of functional competition by state regulatory policy, thus 
generating “prosperity for all”. Elsewhere, I have argued (not being the first) that the 
concept of the “social market economy” was and is an empty formula, the significance of 
which can be seen above all in its social-medial integration power (Spoerer 2007).  
Finally, the economic miracle, which has long been attributed to a wise regulatory and 
economic policy, intimately linked to Erhard and other ordoliberal political scientists, also 
occurred elsewhere in Western Europe. Looking beyond the German horizon shows that 
economic growth was highly dynamic almost everywhere in Europe, where the return to 
democratic capitalism, however declared, was under way, cushioned by the expansion of the 
welfare state (fundamentally Lindlar 1997; and Spoerer 2007, 2009). It is not the “social 
market economy”, the French “planification” or the “Swedish model” that explain the high 
growth rates of the “Trente glorieuses” between 1945 and 1975, but rather more profane 
(but very powerful) structural phenomena such as reconstruction and catching-up (Dumke 
1990; Vonyó 2008, 2018; Ritschl/Eichengreen 2009). In this respect, the “economic miracle” 
was neither limited to West Germany nor was it a “miracle” that would be inaccessible to an 
academic explanation. 
Ritschl pushed this demystification of the West German development path since 
1945/48 even further some years ago. In an essay in the Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 
programmatically entitled “Der späte Fluch des Dritten Reichs” (The Late Curse of the Third 
Reich), he argued in 2005 that the socio-economic structure of the Federal Republic of 
Germany showed a great deal of continuity with the Third Reich due to multiple path 
dependencies.  
To make this point, Ritschl (2005) examines both process and (basic) regulatory policy. 
With regard to process policy, he argues that the debt-financed quasi-Keynesian armament 
policy of the Nazi regime and its supposed successes since 1933 were a major cause of 
Keynesian demand management optimism in the post-war period. The National Socialists 
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had, as it were, supposedly successfully demonstrated what would be taken up again after 
1948 under democratic conditions. 
Ritschl’s claims reach further with regard to continuities in the regulatory economic 
order. The National Socialist regulatory policy, he argued, had installed regulatory regimes in 
Germany creating such strong path dependencies that they were basically retained after 
1948 despite numerous changes in detail. Ritschl (2005: 164, 166; my translation of the 
German original) concludes:  
With the restauration of the status quo from the Third Reich, its economic policy rules 
and regulations also survived, which were intended to replace Weimar’s anonymous 
market society, which had been attested with the odium of failure, with a more 
corporate, communitised system. 
Thus,  
[...] it can be pointedly said that post-war Germany’s economic and competitive order 
was shaped more by Hjalmar Schacht than by Ludwig Erhard. […]. On a regulatory level 
a real break has hardly taken place.  
 
Beyond that, in his “History of German Economic Policy after 1945”, published a decade 
later, Ritschl (2016: 331, 389) writes that with the exception of the Allied ban on cartels and 
the (later abolished) regionalisation of the major banks, “until the amendments of the late 
1950s, the economic order of the Third Reich simply continued to exist”. Tamás Vonyó 
(2018: 188; see the critical review by Streb 2018), who at times also worked at the LSE like 
Ritschl, takes a similar line, even considering the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen 
(GWB, Act Against Restraints of Competition) passed in 1957 a failure. 
Despite all sympathy for attempts to deconstruct the often almost mantra-like recited 
economic founding myths of the early Federal Republic, this interpretation seems to me to 
overshoot and to underestimate the quality of the new beginning around 1948. Following a 
request made by Ritschl on several occasions, I summarise my points of criticism in the 
following. First, I will briefly deal with process policy before turning to regulatory policy in 
the main section. I establish criteria on the basis of which I compare the quality of the 
regulatory policy of the Third Reich with that of the Weimar Republic and the Federal 
Republic. In so doing, I come to the conclusion that Ritschl, as accurate as some of his 
detailed observations may be, generalises them excessively, leaving out central aspects that 
are of much greater importance for the assessment of continuities in regulatory policy. Even 
at the risk of being unoriginal, I come to the clear conclusion that the orthodox view, 
according to which the regulatory structures of the Federal Republic of Germany created in 
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1948/49 represent a structural break and resemble those of the Weimar Republic much 
more than those of the Third Reich, is essentially correct. In other words, from the point of 
view of economic and regulatory policy, the Third Reich was not long, but short. It began in 
1933 and ended in 1945; in terms of regulatory policy in 1948 at the latest. 
 
2. Process policy continuities? 
It is undisputed that from 1933 onwards the National Socialists pursued a credit-financed 
expansive economic policy that correlated with an economic upswing. This is deliberately 
formulated so cautiously because it is by no means clear whether an identifiable causal link 
exists. After Germany effectively abandoned the gold standard in July 1931 and Reich 
Chancellor Heinrich Brüning, in response to the British abandonment of the gold standard in 
September, issued emergency decrees imposing drastic wage and price cuts, and after the 
payment of reparations was effectively suspended in July 1932, an economic upswing would 
probably have taken place anyway (Buchheim 2001; empirically supported by Ritschl 2003; 
see also Ritschl 2002: 56-67; and Spoerer/Streb 2014: 300-301.) In this respect, it is not clear 
whether the National Socialist economic policy deserves the recognition that even the 
contemporary opponents of the regime grudgingly paid to it (Priester 1936). 
National Socialist economic policy is sometimes interpreted as Keynesian (Abelshauser 
1998: 125-126, 131, 169). However, since Keynesian “deficit spending” is typically under-
stood as economic policy measures aimed at raising private (non-governmental, and certain-
ly not armaments-related) consumption, this can also be seen differently (Erbe 1958; Ritschl 
2005: 155-156; and Spoerer 2005: 426). For Ritschl’s point, however, it is not relevant 
whether National Socialist economic policy was Keynesian or not. The fact is that the 
National Socialists pursued a debt-financed expansive economic policy that was perceived as 
successful by contemporaries and thus served as a foil for corresponding Keynesian experi-
ments in the post-war period.  
Wanting to see in this a legacy of the Third Reich, however, seems to me to be an 
expression of a Germany-centred view, for a look at Germany's Western European neigh-
bours and not least at the United States shows that Keynesianism was en vogue throughout 
the Western world (Skidelsky 1978; Hall 1989; Nützenadel 2005: 54-62, 348-352; and Hesse 
2010: 41-43). The supposedly positive experiences with pseudo-Keynesian politics from the 
National Socialist era may have contributed to the fact that Keynesian political concepts 
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were positively connotated in the Federal Republic (see, as a prime example in this context, 
the dissertation by Karl Schiller in 1936, who was Federal Minister of Economics from 1966 
to 1972, also quoted by Ritschl). However, they were certainly not the cause of the Federal 
Republic's planning optimism because of the discrediting of the Third Reich. Apart from that, 
such a claim comes with the problem that the economic policy of the first CDU-led federal 
governments from 1949 until the formation of the grand coalition in 1966 is normally not 
regarded as Keynesian and demand-oriented, but as neo-classical and supply-oriented. In 
the 1950s, the federal government even deliberately pursued a contractionary economic 
policy on several occasions, which at most in the election years 1957 and 1961 turned into a 
clearly expansive fiscal policy (Berger 1997: 158). Only in the second half of the 1960s and 
1970s, when the two oil price crises also challenged economic and social policy, can German 
economic policy be interpreted as Keynesian (Tilly 1993: 218-222; and Giersch et al. 1992: 
139-150). 
However, to interpret the adoption of Keynesian-inspired economic policy as a decisive 
path dependency of process policy from the time of National Socialism would implicitly 
suggest that, after the laborious defeat, its economic policy was also seen as a model 
abroad. This was certainly not the case. Rather, Keynesian economic policy in the West drew 
its legitimation from the high growth rates of the 1950s and 1960s, which contemporaries 
attributed to a successful economic policy. After the war, too, people fell into a kind of politi-
cal illusion (which basically still persists today) as they causally link process policy and econo-
mic development. Only in a retrospective view of economic history has it become clear that, 
on the one hand, the reconstruction after the Second World War and, on the other hand, 
the catching-up to the global productivity leader America were the two driving forces of 
growth, on the wave-combs of which process-policy experiments brought little benefit or 
harm as long as they adhered to some extent to the rules of a democratic capitalism tamed 
by the welfare state (Lindlar 1997; Spoerer 2007, 2009; and Vonyó 2008). 
 
3. Dominance of regulatory continuities? 
It is more difficult to assess the claim that the “economic policy regulations” of the Third 
Reich survived it and that therefore “post-war Germany's economic and competitive order 
was shaped more by Hjalmar Schacht than by Ludwig Erhard”, as Ritschl (2005: 164, 166) 
wrote. It remains to be seen whether the regulatory regimes listed by Ritschl, which were 
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enshrined in law during the Third Reich (handicraft regulations; dual in-company training 
system; regulation of the banking, transport and energy sectors) were specifically National 
Socialist; after all, the preparatory work in some cases goes back far into the Weimar period 
(see the articles in Kollmer-von Oheimb-Loup 2012). In addition, the territorial monopolies in 
the electricity industry prominently highlighted by Ritschl also existed elsewhere at the same 
time (for example in Denmark, Japan, and Canada; see Millward 2005: 134-135, 139; Hosoe 
2006; Bolduc 2015; and, for an overview, Midttun 1997: 5-6). Rather, the question is to what 
extent these examples, even if one were to regard them all with Ritschl as specifically Nazi, 
are representative of the economic and competitive order of the early Federal Republic as a 
whole. 
What one must look for, then, are criteria by which one can measure or at least 
estimate the empirical relevance of the regulatory regimes or economic order introduced 
under National Socialism. From a legal or administrative perspective, one can of course limit 
oneself to a comparison of institutions à la Ritschl. But ultimately, regulatory regimes – like 
all institutions – are to be measured by what they achieve. In the following I will therefore 
take an economic, or more generally speaking, functional perspective. Since we are discus-
sing regulatory and competition policy here, I propose three criteria against which the 
regulatory regimes of the Third Reich and the early Federal Republic should be measured 
(others would be conceivable): first, intensity of competition; second, material prosperity 
and its distribution; third, producer and consumer sovereignty. 
  
3.1. Intensity of competition 
The central feature of a market economy-based system is competition, which serves as a 
detection and sanction mechanism. After 1933, even in the years after the relatively mode-
rate Hjalmar Schacht became Reich Minister of Economics (until 1936) and President of the 
Reichsbank (until 1939), a comprehensive system of state economic governance was already 
in place. The system of economic groups, introduced as early as 1934, brought together 
companies in the same or neighbouring sectors and forced them to cooperate in areas which 
until then each company had quite naturally regarded as an autonomous task: procurement 
of materials, coordination of investments, production, research and development, etc. 
(Tooze 2007: 99-134). The restriction of competition became manifest in a special way 
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through the 1933 Zwangskartellgesetz (Compulsory Cartel Act) and its subsequent imple-
mentation (Feldenkirchen 1985). 
However, this by no means completely eliminated competition; rather, competition 
was shifted increasingly from the anonymous market to the corridors of the arms bureau-
cracy in Berlin. On average, companies that produced armaments earned considerably more 
than those that remained in the consumer goods industry; armament was thus not forced à 
la Stalin (as in a fulminant and grotesque misinterpretation of Temin 1991), but was 
achieved by means of economic incentives (see for the profit perspective ex post Spoerer 
1996 and ex ante Scherner 2008). 
The cartel-friendly attitude in industry and in large parts of politics changed little after 
1945. However, with regard to the future competition regime, the Americans, who in 1945 
had issued a total ban on cartels in their zone that was valid until the GWB, asserted their 
influence and strengthened the liberal forces in their confrontation with the interests of 
industry. The GWB, finally passed in 1957, was a classic compromise that removed many 
sectors of the economy from competition. The eleven exceptional sectors included 
agriculture, transport, banking, post and telecommunications, utilities and insurance – but 
not industry. In post-1945 agriculture, the density of regulation was not nearly comparable 
to that of the Reichsnährstand, under whose roof the National Socialists had forced 
production and distribution as early as 1933. The structural change in agriculture could not 
be stopped by its exemption from the GWB, nor could the Federal Republic's and later 
European agricultural policy. Industry, on the other hand, which since 1945 or 1949 had to 
accept the Allied ban on cartels, which was then confirmed in the GWB, accounted for over 
half of value added (Federal Statistical Office 1972: 264). Thus, the competition regime of 
the Federal Republic of Germany before and also after the adoption of the GWB was 
incomparably more competition-oriented than in the so-called peace years of the Third 
Reich (Schröter 1994: 485-486).  
The opposite argumentation with – admittedly quite significant – exceptional areas 
such as transport and energy, which were deregulated only in the 1990s, establishes the 
exceptions to the rule. Moreover, in France, for example, and until the reforms under 
Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain, these sectors of the economy were also regulated by the 
state for decades. Millward (2005: 72; see also Streb/Streb 2012) has called this pattern of 
regulation, which can be found throughout Europe, “regulation by administrative means”. In 
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the early Federal Republic, however, competition prevailed in most product markets – much 
more so than in the Third Reich, and incidentally also more so than in the relatively strongly 
cartelised Weimar Republic (König 1960).  
 
3.2. Material wealth and its distribution 
The orientation of the economic structure changed fundamentally from 1933 onwards. 
National Socialist economic policy was fully focused on rearmament at a very early stage, as 
Ritschl (1992) pointed out in an early contribution. Through a variety of measures, the state 
channelled only as much resources as necessary into private consumption and as much as 
possible into state consumption. Behind the strong computational growth in gross domestic 
product was the production of weapons and ammunition, not consumer goods (“cannons 
instead of butter”). Therefore, despite the strong increase in real per capita gross domestic 
product in 1936, consumers were no better off than in 1928, and probably not in 1938 either 
(Erbe 1958; Spoerer 2005; and especially Spoerer/Streb 2013a: 84-86). As partial 
compensation for the shift in the fulfilment of consumer desires, the regime also relied on 
virtual consumption, i.e. propagandistically exaggerated promises of consumption in the 
future, such as the Volkswagen or mass tourism (“Kraft durch Freude”, “power through joy“) 
(Berghoff 2001). Christoph Buchheim (1994, 2001) described this shift in the forces of 
growth, which was also reflected in a corresponding change in the industrial structure, as 
“deformed”.  
This deformation certainly also includes special cases and sins of regulatory policy, 
such as the regulation of the energy, communications, and transport sectors, which were 
long maintained in the Federal Republic. But they have apparently hardly hampered the 
strong growth of the West German economy. 
In the Third Reich, the increase in economic growth benefited first and foremost the 
state and secondly those companies that produced what the state needed, directly or 
indirectly, for its political goals. At the same time there was redistribution from the lower 
social strata to the upper ones (Spoerer 2005: 426-427; Dell 2007: 374-375; Banken 2019: 
311-312; and Bartels 2019: 682). Finally, it must be noted that the National Socialist arms 
boom was financed on credit (Table 1), as Reichsbank President Schacht so clearly pointed 
out to Hitler in January 1939 that the latter dismissed the entire Reichsbank board of 
directors (Hansmeyer/Caesar 1976: 380-385). 
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Tab. 1: Average annual net new borrowing in the Third Reich and in the Federal Republic, 
1933-1938 and 1951-1982 
Period In percent of GNP Period In percent of GNP 
    
1933/34 4.2 1951-1960 1.9 
1935/36 6.2 1951-1973 1.6 
1937/38 8.3 1974-1982 3.6 
1933-1938 6.2   
    
 
Sources: Third Reich calculated according to Ritschl (2002, Appendix, Tables A.3 and B.5); Federal Republic 
according to Deutschland in Daten, Tables K07.5 and K13.1 
(http://www.deutschland-in-daten.de/datensatz/). 
 
It is certainly disputable whether the prosperity of the Federal Republic of Germany may 
have been created in the long term at the expense of future generations. But in the 70 years 
of its existence it has never come even close to national bankruptcy (Hansmann 2012: 102-
103). One can also discuss whether prosperity in the Federal Republic is “fairly” distributed, 
but the differences between rich and poor were and are rather slightly below average 
compared to other developed economies (Spoerer/Streb 2013b: 262-264). The ratio of 
government expenditure to GDP rose steadily during the boom phase of the Federal 
Republic and has been hovering just below 50 percent since the 1970s – as in 1938 
(Hansmann 2012: 34). The only difference today is that government spending is allocated 
differently. Whereas in 1936 (1938) about a good 7 (17) per cent of gross domestic product 
went into armaments, the corresponding figures for 1961 are 4 per cent and for 1928 and 
2010 only about 1 per cent each (values for 1936 and 1938 calculated according to Oshima 
1980: 226-227; and Ritschl/Spoerer 1997: 51; values for 1928, 1961 and 2010 according to 
Spoerer 2015: 109). In a parliamentary democracy, the size of the state, the allocation of its 
expenditures and revenues, and also the extent of income redistribution is based on the 
majority of voters’ will. This is not intended to uncritically sing the high song of the Federal 
Republic's economic and social order, but Ritschl’s claims make it necessary to recall these 
fundamental facts. The growth and distribution of prosperity in the Federal Republic was 
and is certainly not deformed, or at least much less so than in the Third Reich.  
The lines of continuity between the Weimar Republic and the Federal Republic are also 
evident in the shaping of the welfare state. The three classical pillars of the German social 
security system (health, accident and old-age insurance) created in the eighties of the 19th 
century were extended to five in 1927 with unemployment insurance and in 1995 with 
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nursing care insurance. In this respect, the Third Reich, which, for example, softened social 
security entitlements by introducing “ethnic” criteria, represented a temporary aberration, 
the cruel culmination of which was the destruction of “worthless life” since 1939 (Hockerts 
1998: 23-25; and Schmidt 2005: 59-71, 167-169). 
 
3.3. Producer and consumer sovereignty 
Perhaps the greatest difference in the economic and competitive order before and after 
1945/48 is the extent of producer and consumer sovereignty. In order not to do Ritschl 
injustice, as a precaution I will compare the Federal Republic's order with that of the early 
Nazi regime, which was strongly influenced by the moderate Schacht in his double function 
as Reich Minister of Economics and President of the Reichsbank, i.e. until 1936.  
The foreign exchange controls introduced in 1931 were considerably expanded by 
Schacht in 1934 as part of the “New Plan”. While companies had already had problems in 
the previous three years conducting their international business almost normally, now all 
their dealings with foreign countries (in so far as they were cash-effective) were subject to 
strict regulation (Ebi 2004). In particular, companies that were not armaments-critical were 
forced to convert their production because of the very extensive import restrictions, some of 
which became de facto bans. This has been examined in more detail for the textile and 
margarine industries, to name but a few examples (Höschle 2004; Pelzer/Reith 2001; and 
Hensler 2008). The freedom of investment had also been increasingly restricted by bans. 
Samuel Lurié (1947) has already described this in detail. Other prohibitions concerned the 
setting of prices and wages (Steiner 2006). Even in the “peace years” of the Third Reich, 
companies thus operated in a network of state-fixed prices and wages. 
Some economic historians interpret these far-reaching restrictions on entrepreneurial 
freedom of decision as an expression of a quasi-socialist planned or command economy 
(Temin 1991; and the debate between Hayes 2009 and Buchheim/Scherner 2009; in 
summary Plumpe 2018: 126-130). Even if one (like me) may not go so far, it is nevertheless 
obvious that the sovereignty of producers was already restricted in the “peace years” of the 
Third Reich to a much greater extent than ever before in the Weimar Republic or in the 
Federal Republic. 
The same goes for consumer sovereignty. The National Socialist regime already 
restricted consumers’ freedom of choice in the “peace years”. By expanding its control over 
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foreign exchange, the regime curtailed access to imported consumer goods, especially after 
1934. This by no means only affected luxury goods, but also the quality of everyday clothing, 
for example by imposing a quota on cotton wool imports and promoting semi-synthetic 
substitute fibres (rayon, artificial silk). The obligation to add butter made margarine more 
expensive, which was preferred as a cheap spreadable fat especially by the lower strata of 
society (Pelzer/Reith 2001; and Spoerer/Streb 2013a). Many other examples could be cited 
(Berghoff 1999). 
With the introduction of the Deutschmark, the release of most prices in the Leitsätze-
gesetz and the abolition of the system of rationing of consumer goods which had been 
introduced on 28 August 1939, the purchasing decisions of German consumers depended 
only on their individual preferences and purchasing power – as was already the case during 
the Weimar Republic and the German Empire (Reckendrees 2007). 
 
4. Conclusion 
Yesterday, printed in thick print, crammed into a large format: Exploiting the hamster 
psychosis. A peddler in Leipzig bought yarn for 10 Pf the roll, sold for 30 in detail. For 
price gouging and spreading the psychosis he was sentenced to six months in prison. 
Today: “Mrs Lehmann, please sew some buttons on.” – “Do you have any thread?” – 
“…?” – “There is no black or white thread in Dresden”.  
(Klemperer 1995: 164) 
 
The fact that as early as November 1934 consumer goods were hoarded and sold on the 
black market and that a university professor was unable to have buttons sewn on illustrates 
in an anecdotal way what economic historians, following Christoph Buchheim, call a “defor-
med economic order”. Even in “peacetime”, the National Socialist regime was unable to 
satisfy the simplest of consumer needs – a state of affairs that would have been unthinkable 
in Germany’s neighbouring countries at the same time. For producers, too, much had 
already changed by the end of 1934. They saw their scope for entrepreneurial decision-
making restricted in many ways, especially in investment and pricing policy. After all, the 
regime sweetened their renunciation in many ways. The economy boomed, and wages and 
above all profits flowed abundantly. But in case of conflict the state had the upper hand, as 
some (few) entrepreneurs had to experience in an exemplary way, for example Hugo Junkers 
(Budraß 1998: 320-335). There has never been anything comparable in the Federal Republic. 
In this respect, I think it can be said without any exaggeration that Germany’s 
economic policy regulations did not survive National Socialism (or at most only in part for 
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three years), that they underwent a fundamental transformation from 1948 onwards, and 
that the economic and competitive order in the 1950s was thus already much more influen-
ced by Erhard than by Schacht – if one really wants to put this in terms of individual persons. 
Fortunately, a clear break occurred at the regulatory level in 1948-49. A strongly regulating 
economic system, which directed resources to the uses desired by a dictatorial regime, was 
replaced by a market economy-based system designed by politicians working towards re-
election. Certainly, a structurally conservative early economic policy oriented towards the 
coal and steel industry delayed the structural change, but the economic order was in 
principle characterised from the beginning by the interplay of supply and demand. As a 
result, the Federal Republic definitely shows more continuity with the Weimar Republic than 
with the Third Reich in terms of economic and regulatory perspective. 
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